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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE POLITICAL (SCIENCE) CONTEXT OF JUDGING

LEE EPSTEIN, JACK KNIGHT & ANDREW D. MARTIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
For at least two decades now, the legal academy has made extensive use of
the theories and tools of the economist. Though not all in the law world view
this as happy development, few would deny its importance. Indeed, the
integration of law and economics is so complete that nary a substantive area of
law remains untouched; nary a law curriculum fails to house a course on the
subject; and nary a law faculty lacks a specialist, if not a Ph.D., in economics.
The same could not be said of political science. In recent years, theories
regularly bandied about by political scientists—such as “the attitudinal model”
and “the strategic account”—and data sources that we regularly use—such as
“The Spaeth Database”—are now making appearances in the law reviews, but
“recent” is the operative word. It has been in only the last few years that law
professors have shown much interest in political science approaches to
judging; and that interest is spotty to say the least.1
That is why we so appreciate Professor Merrill’s effort. From top to
bottom, he consciously seeks to engage political scientists in ways that are
virtually unknown in the law world.2 He has gone to great lengths to

* Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of Political
Science, Chair of the Department of Political Science, and Professor of Law at Washington
University in St. Louis; Jack Knight is the Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government at
Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew D. Martin is Assistant Professor of Political Science
at Washington University. We thank the National Science Foundation (grants SES-0079963 and
SES-0135855) and the Center for New Institutional Social Science for supporting our work on
strategic decision making, and adapt several passages in this essay from some of that work.
1. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and
Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
2. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 572 (2003) (“[I]n discussing some recent developments on the
Rehnquist Court . . . I hope to stimulate political scientists to take a closer look at the changing
behavior of the Rehnquist Court, using their superior empirical and model-building skills.”); see
also id. at 573 (“Indeed, if I accomplish nothing else in this Lecture, I hope I can inspire political
783
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understand (what is largely) our literature and to apply (what are largely) our
tools to illuminate an intriguing phenomenon. Moreover, at the end of the day,
he tells us something really fascinating about the current Supreme Court, “The
Rehnquist Court(s).”
These are some of the many assets of Professor Merrill’s lecture. As is
probably the case for all pioneering efforts, however, it also has its share of
deficits. Mainly, we think that in future research, he—and indeed, other legal
academics—might make even better use of our theories and technologies by
gaining a firmer grasp on the overall “political science” project, developing a
more nuanced understanding of our leading theoretical accounts, and assessing
the implications of those accounts against more reliable and valid data via
more appropriate methodology.
That Professor Merrill’s work could be improved with greater attention to
these matters comes as no surprise. We need only think of the initial works
invoking theories and methods of economics: many were less than adequate
adoptions or adaptations, evincing a lack of understanding of even the basics of
the prevailing paradigm in that field. Years later, perhaps as a result of more
training, deep reading, and the influx of economists into the legal academy,
that has changed. The law journals are now replete with enlightened and
enlightening studies relying, in part or in whole, on the theories or tool of
economics.
We believe, as does Professor Merrill, that political science has at least as
much to add to our understanding of law-related phenomena, but we hope that
it does not take as long for legal academics to develop an appreciation of our
world, and that Professor Merrill’s paper is only the first in what will, without
doubt, be a long and fruitful dialogue between political scientists and legal
academics.
Professor Merrill has done a great service by starting the conversation. We
would like to push it even further by clarifying what it is that we political
scientists do and by exploring our work within the context of Professor
Merrill’s Lecture. At times we are critical, but by no means do we wish to
undermine his research. Quite the opposite: We only seek to demonstrate how
he might bolster some of his claims with greater attention to theory and data.
II. POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND JUDGING: THE NATURE OF OUR PROJECT
While it almost never comes as a surprise to political scientists that legal
academics know a lot about judging, the converse does not always hold. In our
many conversations with law professors, we have learned that a significant
number do not realize that political scientists even study courts and law, much
less know something about them.
scientists to take up the differences in the Rehnquist Court before and after 1994 as an appropriate
subject for further investigation.”).
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Professor Merrill is, of course, an exception, and there are some, perhaps
even a growing number, of others. Their size, however, remains small, and
even among the hardy few exist some misunderstandings about the nature of
our project. In what follows, we undertake a clarification. We begin with a bit
of history about disciplinary interest in the subject of judging and then outline
the three primitives of work—questions, theory, and data—with some attention
to how Professor Merrill’s makes use of them.
Our emphasis on “bit” and “outline” is no mistake. We do not intend to
provide a review of the vast literature political scientists have produced on
judging; others already have done that.3 Nor do we aim to offer a
comprehensive guide to the rules and guidelines that govern our research
program; this too has been produced.4 Our goals are rather far more modest: to
provide a flavor of our project just large enough to retain the interest of the
Professor Merrills in the legal academy—those already familiar with some its
features—and just ample enough to whet the appetites of others.
A.

Some Historical Notes

Interest in judging among political scientists is both quite old and relatively
new. The regular appearance of articles with titles such as Constitutional Law
in 1909-1910: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the October Term, 19095 is a testament to the long-standing
tradition of scholarship in this area, as are the many books and essays produced
3. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
(2002); Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RES.
Q. 749 (1994); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A
Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000).
4. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (2002).
5. Eugene Wambaugh, Constitutional Law in 1909-1910: The Constitutional Decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1909, 4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483
(1910). This article, published in an early volume of the discipline’s flagship journal, the
American Political Science Review, proved “so popular,” as Thomas G. Walker writes,
that the APSR decided to make it an annual event, a tradition that continued for the next
forty years. A series of distinguished scholars were [sic] commissioned to write these
pieces: Weinbaugh [sic] (1910-1912), Emlin McClain (1915), Thomas Reed Powell
(1918-1920), Edward S. Corwin (1920-1924), Robert E. Cushman (1925-1928), Robert J.
Harris (1950-1951), and David Fellman (1949, 1952-1961). The Western Political
Quarterly published a similar annual review, for years written by Paul Bartholomew,
which ran until 1972. In addition, a regular feature in every issue of the early volumes of
the APSR was a compilation “Decisions of American Courts on Points of Public Law,”
edited by Robert E. Cushman.
Thomas G. Walker, The Development of the Field 1 (Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the authors).
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by scholars such as Reed Powell, Edward S. Corwin, and Robert Cushman (all
of whom served as presidents of the American Political Science Association).
Truth be told, however, there was nothing very political science-like about
these early works; most were doctrinal pieces that could have—perhaps should
have—been written by law professors of the day. In fact, the “political
science” authors of some of these works went so far as explicitly to reject
politics. Cushman’s examination of the 1936-37 Term—one of the most
volatile in Supreme Court history—is exemplary. After acknowledging that
the “1936 term . . . will probably be rated a notable one,” he enumerated some
of the facts “one should bear in mind,” such as the facts Roosevelt had won a
landslide reelection and had submitted his Court-packing plan.6 Rather than
demonstrate how those “facts” might have affected Court decisions, however,
Cushman simply noted that “[n]o suggestion is made as to what inferences, if
any, may be drawn from them.”7
Not until the 1940s did our scholarship begin to move from “law-like” to
“politics-laden” (though, we must admit, some among us still churn out the
former). That transformation came about largely as a result of the efforts of
one scholar, C. Herman Pritchett, who may be virtually unknown in the law
world but whose work remains a powerful presence in ours. What Pritchett
did, in some sense, was to move legal realism from the sole province of law
schools to the corridors of political science departments.8 Like some
proponents of socio-legal jurisprudence,9 he argued that judges are “motivated
by their own preferences.”10 To put this in today’s parlance, he was probably
the first political scientist to view judges as “single-minded seekers of legal
policy”11—an assumption about jurists’ goals that continues, as we describe
later, to stand as a hallmark of the political science approach to judging.
In another sense, though, Pritchett did far more than transport legal
realism, lock, stock, and barrel, to our discipline. For one thing, Pritchett,
unlike most of the realists, was a conscious and quantitative empiricist.12 Not
6. Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1936-37: The Constitutional Decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 278, 278
(1938).
7. Id.
8. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, at 86-89.
9. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE (1949); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951).
10. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES, 1937-1947, at xii-xiii (1948).
11. Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992).
12. For classic examples, see PRITCHETT, supra note 10; C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of
Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890
(1941).
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only did he assess his arguments against numerical data, but his research
actually derives from a simple empirical observation (one that we depict in
Figure 1): dissents were beginning, in the 1930s and 1940s, to accompany
many Supreme Court decisions. It was that observation that led Pritchett to the
obvious question: If precedent drives Court decisions, as many in political
science and law maintained, then why did various Justices in interpreting the
same legal provisions consistently reach different conclusions on important
questions of the day? It was that question that led him to the same solution
upon which the realists happened: rules based on precedent were little more
than smokescreens behind which judges hide their values.
FIGURE 1
Percentage of U.S. Supreme Court Cases with at Least One Dissenting
Opinion, 1800-2000 Terms13

Unlike his colleagues in the law schools, however, Pritchett attempted to
confirm this claim—the realists’ intuition—with data he mined from the voting
records of the Justices, which he analyzed with then-sophisticated
methodological tools. It was Pritchett who first systematically examined
dissents and voting blocs on the Court; he was also the first to invoke left-right
13. The data underlying Figure 1 were taken from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 211-15 tbl.3-2 (3rd ed. 2003).
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voting scales to study ideological behavior. That Pritchett was able to place
Justices of the Roosevelt Court on continuums, such as the one depicted in
Figure 2, helped him substantiate his claim that political attitudes have a strong
influence on judicial decisions.
FIGURE 2
Pritchett’s Left-Right Continuum of Justices Serving Between 1939 and 194114

Black Douglas

Left

Murphy Reed Frankfurter Court Reed Stone

Hughes

Roberts McReynolds

Right

There is yet a second distinctive feature of Pritchett’s work: while it may
draw on the insights of the realists to make sense of dissents, it does not stop
with their writings. To Pritchett (and, later, his student, Walter F. Murphy), if
Justices are single-minded seekers of policy, they necessarily care about the
“law,” broadly defined. Furthermore, if they care about the ultimate state of
the law, then they may be willing to modulate their views to avoid an extreme
reaction from Congress and the President.15 Pritchett (and, again, Murphy), in
other words, tells a tale of shrewd Justices, who anticipate the reactions of the
other institutions and take those reactions into account in their decision
making. The Justices he depicts would rather hand down a ruling that comes
close to, but may not exactly reflect, their preferences than, in the long run, see
other political actors completely override their decisions.
Those who already have heard or read Professor Merrill’s lecture can
probably now understand one reason why Pritchett is such a towering figure in
our discipline. He injected “politics” into the study of courts and, in so doing,
provided the fodder for the two most influential contemporary political
accounts of judicial behavior: the attitudinal model and the strategic account,
both of which figure into Professor Merrill’s narrative. However different
these accounts may be—and they certainly are—both can be traced to
Pritchett.16

14. Pritchett, supra note 12, at 894. Reed appears twice because his dissents were divided
between the liberal and conservative wings of the Court. Id. at 895.
15. See WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,
CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960 (1961).
16. On the other hand, we do not want to overstate Pritchett’s contemporary importance.
While he is without doubt the founder of the modern-day political science project on judging,
others more fully developed what he began. For their contributions, see THE PIONEERS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
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We have more to say about these soon but we should not gloss over other
reasons for Pritchett’s influence that may be less transparent from Professor
Merrill’s work. Certainly one centers on what Pritchett studied: judicial
decision making. Another concerns his use of data to assess the implications
of his approach. These, along with theory, deserve some discussion—not
solely because of the contributions Pritchett made, but also because they
represent the primitives of the political science project of judging. To
appreciate that project—as well as Professor Merrill’s contribution to it—it is
important to have a baseline appreciation of these three dimensions.
B.

What We Study: Judicial Decision Making

Pritchett was fascinated by the question of why judges reach the decisions
that they do, and that question remains at the core of the contemporary political
science project on judging. This is not to say that we ignore other features of
judicial politics. Our ability to summon innumerable citations to research
examining the selection of judges and Justices,17 the views of the public about
courts,18 and the impact of judicial decisions19 confirms that we do not.20 It is,
however, to say that studies of judicial decision making continue to dominate
the disciplinary program.
In reporting this, we hope to convey two features of the political scientists’
work. First, as our stress on why indicates, our research is largely nonnormative. Many of us are not all that interested in debating questions of how
should judges reach decisions; rather, we are interested in how and why they
do reach decisions. Still, we hasten to note, our research is not wholly devoid
17. See, e.g., DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
COURT NOMINEES (1999); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model
of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court
Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992); Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on
Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and The U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s
Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L.
Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992);
Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme
Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079 (1996).
19. See, e.g., CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
20. Then again, all three of these subjects—judicial nominations, public opinion, and
impact—have potential ties to judicial decision making. For essays making these sorts of
connections, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts
in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 117 (2002); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 87 (1996); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware?: Presidential Success Through
Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557 (2000).
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME
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of normative implications.21 To see this, we need only consider studies that
demonstrate the effect of ideology on judicial decisions; surely, such a finding
has important implications for debates about the selection and retention of
jurists.22 We could say the same of research investigating whether women
judges bring a “different voice” to the bench,23 whether jurists respond
differentially to distinct classes of litigants,24 and whether elected political
actors exert some constraint on the decisions of non-elected judges25—to name
just three others.
The second feature we want to convey is that our concerns, on some level,
are fairly narrow. To be sure, there are handfuls of interesting (and even
influential) studies of things other than judicial decision making—again, the
selection of judges and the impact of their decisions come readily to mind. For
the most part, however, the vast majority of serious theoretical and empirical
research conducted by political scientists centers on judicial decision making.
Yet this focus, for several reasons, is less narrow than it might seem. First,
to political scientists decision making encompasses questions covering a range
of judicial behaviors: from why judges on discretionary courts make the caseselection decisions that they do;26 to how judges interpret constitutional and

21. This holds whether we choose to develop them or not (as is too often the case).
22. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3; Segal et al., supra note 20.
23. This is a rather large literature. For relatively recent reviews, see Lee Epstein, Beverly
Blair Cook, in WOMEN IN LAW: A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 51 (Rebecca Mae
Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial
Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001); Michael
E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal?: Upperdogs
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992); S. Sidney
Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
902 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001); Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker,
The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast,
Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992) [hereinafter
Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes]; John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn
& Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation]; Andrew D. Martin, Public Policy, the
Supreme Court, and the Separation of Powers (Sept. 1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the authors).
26. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Gregory A. Caldeira et
al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549
(1999); Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).
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statutory provisions;27 to reasons underlying their votes on the merits of
cases;28 to what attempts judges make to induce compliance with their specific
rulings as well as to gain respect for their institution;29 and just about
everything and anything in between.
Second, our focus covers more actors than simply judges making decisions
at a particular moment in time. To explain why jurists make the case-selection
choices that they do, we must look beyond the petitions that come to them, to
the actors who brought them and the interest groups that support them.30 To
understand why judges interpret statutes or the Constitution in particular ways,
we cannot ignore the role played by contemporaneous Congresses and
executives.31 To appreciate votes on collegial courts, we can hardly neglect
the role played by doctrine created by previous judges.32 To investigate
matters of compliance and legitimacy, we must contemplate the views of the
public and the effects of those views on other political actors.33
Finally, our concentration on decision making encompasses more than
political explanations. Politics may lie at the root of many accounts of judicial
decisions, but as scientists (and not advocates) we more than appreciate other
explanations; we realize that unless we contemplate rival accounts we cannot
reach conclusions with any degree of certainty about our own.34 What this
27. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes, supra note 25; McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3 (1994); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) [hereinafter
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts]; James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and
Coordinate Construction of the Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447 (1997); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 28 (1997).
28. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3; C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of
Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics
Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981).
29. See, e.g., JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 19; Knight & Epstein, supra note 20.
30. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26; Caldeira et al., supra note 26.
31. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Epstein,
Knight & Martin, supra note 25; Meernik & Ignagni, supra note 27. For a different view, see
Segal, supra note 27.
32. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018
(1996). For a different view, see HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
33. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 304 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Caldeira, supra
note 18; Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova, supra note 20.
34. If scholars ignore competing explanations, their work will suffer from what is known as
“omitted variable bias,” making any causal inferences they reach suspect. Specifically, scholars
must take into account (that is, control for or hold constant) variables designed to control for the
implications of other theories that do not necessarily square with theirs (that is, rival
explanations or hypotheses) if the rival variable meets one of the following conditions: (1) it is
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means, at least for the political science project on judging, is that we are not
simply the “bean counters” or “reductionists” of which we are occasionally
accused. If we want to say that the courts involved in Bush v. Gore35 reached
decisions on the basis of the partisan preferences, we cannot begin and end our
research with counts of the number of Democratic judges who voted for Gore
and the number of Republican judges who voted for Bush; we must also
examine the existing state of precedent, as well as the many other factors,
whether political or not, that may have come into play.36 If we want to say that
briefs filed by the Solicitor General increase the odds of the Supreme Court
granting certiorari, we must control for all the other “variables” that we believe
affect the Court’s decision, again, whether political or not.37 Likewise, to
provide just one last example, if we want to say that political attitudes
determine votes, we cannot stop with a demonstration of a correlation between
attitudes and votes; we also must take into account the legal facts at issue.38
Seen in this way, Professor Merrill’s research both does and does not fit
comfortably within the political science project of judging. On the one hand,
Professor Merrill is, as we are, concerned with various features of judicial
decision making. Virtually none of the behaviors he identifies as altering
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts have escaped the attention of
political scientists. Vast bodies of literature exist on the Court’s agenda,39
coalition formation,40 voting splits,41 and so on.
On the other hand, and ironically enough, Professor Merrill pushes our
emphasis on politics further than we do. Take, for example, his assessment of
the separation of powers model, which considers whether or not the Court
agreed with the position taken by the Solicitor General. When he finds, in
related to (correlated with) the key causal variable; (2) it has an effect on the dependent variable;
(3) it is causally prior to (for example, preceding in time) the key causal variable. For more
details, see Epstein & King, supra note 4.
35. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
36. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
37. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26.
38. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3.
39. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26;
Caldeira et al., supra note 26; Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States
Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002).
40. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
(1976); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court, 16
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 208 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms
in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874 (1998); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001); Thomas G. Walker et al., On the
Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361
(1988).
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contrast to the “prediction” generated by his version of the model, that the
“conservative majority” on the first Rehnquist Court was not “especially
deferential to the conservative administration,” he suggests the possibility that
“the Court was not being very strategic during this period.”42
This conclusion—not to mention Professor Merrill’s understanding and
assessment of the model—is problematic in several regards, and we visit them
soon enough. Most relevant here is Professor Merrill’s failure to take into
account other factors—especially apolitical factors—that might have caused
the Court to reach the decisions that it did.43 Without a consideration of these,
not only does he fail to shed as much light on the phenomenon as he would
like, he also opens himself up to precisely the same charges that have been
leveled at political scientists: that we are mere “number crunchers” who focus
too much on politics to the exclusion of law and “ideas.”
C. Theory and Its Observable Implications
If the political science project on judging is primarily aimed at answering
questions pertaining to judicial decision making (broadly defined), then theory
and its observable implications (sometimes called hypotheses or expectations)
are crucial tools for enabling us to accomplish this goal. By “theory,” we
mean “a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research
question”;44 by “observable implications,” we mean things that we would
expect to detect in the real world if our theory is right. To assess a feminist
theory of judging, say, one that holds that women judges speak in a different
voice, we would need to write down all the observable implications of the
theory—for example, women judges are more likely to strike down laws that
categorize on the basis of gender—and then evaluate those implications against
data. To assess a partisan theory of judging, we would likewise need to record
all the possible implications—for example, Democratic judges are more likely
to support positions advocated by Democratic candidates in litigation—and so
too assess them against data. Only by comparing the theoretical implications
with some relevant empirical observations can we learn whether the theory
likely is to be correct.
The importance of theory and its observable implications has not been
missed by political scientists who study courts. Indeed, theorizing about
judging has, since the days of Pritchett, become something of a cottage
industry. Prior to his research, the vast majority of studies lacked any. Many
were simply doctrinal analyses of the products of judicial deliberations—that

42. Merrill, supra note 2, at 626-27.
43. Exemplars are George & Epstein, supra note 11; Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D. Reedy,
The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General, 41 W. POL. Q.
553 (1988).
44. KING ET AL., supra note 4, at 19 (emphasis added).
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is, decisions and opinions—that were heavy on the doctrine, short on analysis,
and devoid of theoretical underpinnings. As Thomas G. Walker has written,
however, all that changed in the late-1950s and early 1960s: “Theoretical
innovation exploded. Attitude theory, social background theory, role theory,
fact pattern analysis, and others were used in attempts to explain judicial
decision making.”45 To Walker’s list, we—writing in 2003—could add dozens
more that scholars now invoke to guide their work on courts and judges.
1.

A Simple Theory: The Attitudinal Model

Almost needless to write then, there is no “one” theory of judging, much
less a unifying paradigm, to which all political scientists subscribe. Theories
come in many types, levels of abstraction, and substantive applications. Some
on Walker’s list, for example, are simple, small, or tailored to fit particular
circumstances, perhaps seeking to account for only one aspect of judicial
decision making or but a single Court.
One that Professor Merrill invokes—the contemporary version of
Pritchett’s preference-based theory of judging, known as the attitudinal
model—is such a theory. It simply says this: the votes of judges on the merits
of cases will reflect their sincerely-held ideological (read: liberal or
conservative) attitudes over particular matters of public policy if (1) those
judges lack political or electoral accountability, (2) have no ambition for
higher office, and (3) serve on a court of last resort that controls its own
agenda.46 The sole goal of this theory, then, is to explain the votes Justices of
45. Walker, supra note 5, at 5.
46. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, for the clearest account of the attitudinal model.
As Professor Merrill notes, of all the accounts political scientists invoke to explain
features of judicial decision making, this model has perhaps come under the most fire from legal
academics. Merrill, supra note 2, at 591. While we do not subscribe to this approach, we do
believe that some of this criticism is unwarranted, as it seems to stem from a lack of
understanding of the model rather than a serious consideration of its merits. For example, the
account is not as reductionist as some legal scholars have alleged: it does not merely say that
liberal judges will always vote in the liberal direction or that all conservatives will always cast
conservative votes; rather, it places emphasis on “the facts of . . . case[s] vis-à-vis . . . ideological
attitudes.” SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, at 86; see also id. at 110. No adherent of the
attitudinal model, in other words, would say that underlying left-right political attitudes fully
explain votes or outcomes. They would instead say that case facts “juxtaposed against . . . [the]
personal policy preferences [of judges]” determine how any particular judge reaches a decision in
any particular case. Id. at 312.
A simple example suffices to make the point. Let us suppose that we could order the
facts in cases involving searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment from the least to the
most intrusive search, as illustrated in the figure below, adapted from Segal and Spaeth. Id. at
326. Further suppose that we could order Justices along that same continuum, from most liberal
to most conservative according to their indifference points. Now, if we were to spin the
attitudinal model in accord with much of the legal literature, we would simply say that Justice
Brennan would vote to strike down all searches, Justice Rehnquist would vote to uphold all
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the United States Supreme Court cast on the merits of cases. It does not
attempt to account for votes made by judges on other American courts because
no jurists other than United States Supreme Court Justices meet the conditions
of the model. Moreover, it only attempts to account for votes cast on the
merits of cases; no other judicial choices (even and including votes on
certiorari) come under its reach.
That is why we are troubled by Professor Merrill’s conclusion that the
attitudinal model cannot explain many of the differences he identifies between
the first and second Rehnquist Courts, including the “decline in emphasis on
social issues,” the “paucity of doctrinal innovations in cases involving social
issues during the first Rehnquist Court,” “the collapse in the size of the Court’s
docket,” and so on. 47 The model was not designed to explain these things, as
even its most ardent supporters readily admit.
This is not to say that the attitudinal account is useless to Professor Merrill
in his quest to explore distinctions between the first and second Rehnquist
Courts. Quite the opposite: It could be exceptionally helpful in aiding
Professor Merrill to discern whether differences do in fact (or should) emerge
in the outcomes of cases produced by the first and second Rehnquist Courts.
Professor Merrill could pursue this in any number of ways.
A very simple one entails an examination of the median Justice over time.
Assume, for a moment, that we can order the most preferred positions of the
Justices over a particular policy area—whether federalism, “social issues,” or
any other—from left (most “liberal”) to right (most “conservative”) on a single

searches, and Justice Breyer would sometimes uphold and sometimes strike down searches. This
interpretation, however, misses a key variable in the attitudinal model: case facts. On the
attitudinal model, Justices do not simply vote willy-nilly in accord with their policy preferences.
They will rather vote to uphold any search with facts placing it to the left of their indifference
points and strike any search to the right. Accordingly, yes, Rehnquist would have voted to
sustain the searches at issue in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), but he would not have supported the
search at issue in a case that was to the right of his point (labeled in the figure “more intrusive
case”). Furthermore, yes, Brennan would have voted to strike the searches in the three cases, but
not in the “less intrusive case.” Finally, we need not guess about Breyer: he would uphold the
searches in Leon and Terry, but not Mapp.
The Attitudinal Model: An Example
Brennan

Breyer

Rehnquist

Less

More
Less
Intrusive
Case

Leon

Terry

Mapp

Degree of Intrusiveness of Search

47. Merrill, supra note 2, at 601.

More
Intrusive
Case
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dimension, as we have done in Figure 3. Further assume, as the attitudinal
model does, that all Justices vote in a non-strategic fashion, (that is, in line
with their sincere policy preferences) and that those preferences are singlepeaked.48 Under these conditions, the outcome of a case should reflect the
preferences of the median Justice (here, Kennedy). Hence, if we want to make
a case for the existence of two Rehnquist Courts in terms of voting and
outcomes—the only phenomena to which the attitudinal model speaks—we
might examine whether we detect a change in the Court’s median.
FIGURE 3
Hypothetical Distribution of Preferences
Stevens Ginsburg Breyer

Left

Souter

Kennedy O’Connor Rehnquist Scalia Thomas

Right

Do we observe such a change? The answer, as Figure 4 shows, is a
qualified yes. This figure presents the Martin-Quinn estimated location of the
median Justice, along with the identity of that Justice.49 Using these
preferences scores, we find a significant difference in the average median
Justice between the first and second Rehnquist Courts (0.799 versus 0.616; p =
0.003). Moreover, that key median position, occupied by (relative moderates)
Justices White and Souter for much of the 1986-93 term period, now appears
to belong chiefly to (relative conservatives) Kennedy and O’Connor.
Accordingly, under the attitudinal model, we might anticipate policies
produced by today’s Justices to reflect a more right-of-center orientation than
they did some seven years ago.50

48. In other words, we assume that the actors prefer an outcome that is nearer to their ideal
points than one that is further away, or to put it more technically, “beginning at [an actor’s] ideal
point, utility always declines monotonically in any . . . direction. This . . . is known as singlepeakedness of preferences.” Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 259, 263 (1988).
49. Martin and Quinn use voting data for all Justices serving on the Supreme Court from
1937 to the present to estimate the preferred policy position, or revealed preference, of each
Justice. The model is dynamic, in that the policy preferences of the Justices are allowed to evolve
throughout time. By statistically controlling for different dockets, their data can be used to
investigate the phenomenon of preference change. Their modeling strategy also allows
computing other quantities of interest, such as the location and identity of the median Justice. See
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
50. For a qualification on this claim, see supra note 46.
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FIGURE 4
Justice Occupying the Median Position (Martin-Quinn Scores),
1986-2000 Terms51

We respond with a qualified yes, however, because the onset of the move
to the right appears to come well before the 1994 Term, perhaps as early as the
1991 Term. Between 1986 and 1990, the median position, largely held by
Justice White, hovered around 0.865; for all subsequent Terms, it dropped by
0.206, to 0.659 (p = 0.027). This is a greater decline than that which occurred
between Merrill’s first and second Rehnquist Courts, and may be directly
attributable to Justice Thomas’s arrival and Justice Marshall’s departure.
Seen in this way, Professor Merrill is exactly right to focus on Justice
Thomas in his discussion of the attitudinal model. He also seems right to
center his comparison on the pre- and post-1994 terms. While key alterations
in preferences began before that, the full movement toward the right stabilized

51. The Martin-Quinn estimates of the policy preference for every Justice serving from 1937
to the present, as well as the location of the median Justice, are available electronically. See
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Ideal Points for the U.S. Supreme Court, available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2002).
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in 1994, with, as we noted above, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor vying for
the median position rather than the more moderate Justices Souter and White.52
2.

A More Ambitious Approach: The Strategic Account

While the attitudinal model is not particularly ambitious, we cannot say the
same about the other primary theory Professor Merrill invokes: the strategic
account. This account—an increasingly common one in political science (as
well as in legal) circles—belongs to a class of non-parametric rational choice
models as it assumes that goal-directed actors operate in a strategic or
interdependent decision making context. Specifically, and in the context of
judging, it holds that: (1) judges make choices in order to achieve certain
goals; (2) judges act strategically in the sense that their choices depend on their
expectations about the choices of other actors; and (3) these choices are
structured by the institutional setting in which they are made.53
Notice several differences between this strategic account and the attitudinal
model. One centers on goals. Under the attitudinal model, Justices pursue one
and only one goal: policy. Under the strategic account, it is up to the
researcher to specify a priori the actors’ goals; the researcher may select any
motivation(s) she believes that the particular actors hold. We emphasize this
point because it is the source of a great deal of confusion in the literature, with
some scholars suggesting that on the strategic account the only goal actors
pursue entails policy.
We understand the source of this confusion. Virtually every existing
strategic account of judicial decisions posits that Justices pursue policy, that is,
their goal is to see public policy—the ultimate state of the law—reflect their
preferences. This includes Pritchett’s and Merrill’s work, as well as most of
ours. Again, however, this need not be the case; under the strategic account,
researchers could posit any number of other goals, be they jurisprudential or
institutional.
Because so much confusion exists over this point, let us drive it home with
the simple example shown in Figure 5.54 There, we depict a hypothetical set of
preferences over a particular policy, say, a civil rights statute. The horizontal
lines represent a (civil rights) policy space, here, ordered from left (most
“liberal”) to right (most “conservative”); the vertical lines show the
preferences (the “most preferred positions”) of the actors relevant in this
52. This, of course, raises the question: To what extent did this change actually affect Court
outcomes? Attitudinal advocates have several strategies for addressing this question, but one that
would be relatively easy to deploy is the development of fact-pattern models. See, e.g., SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 3; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 31; see also generally, JON ELSTER, RATIONAL
CHOICE (1986).
54. We adapt the discussion in this and the next paragraph from Ferejohn & Weingast, A
Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 25.
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example: the median member of the contemporaneous Congress (M) and of the
key contemporaneous committees and other gatekeepers (C) in Congress that
make the decision over whether to propose civil rights legislation to their
respective houses.55 Note that we also identify the contemporaneous
committees’ indifference point (C(M)) “where the [Supreme] Court can set
policy which the committee likes no more than the opposite policy that would
be chosen by the full chamber.”56 To put it another way, because the
indifference point and the median member of current Congress are equidistant
from the committees, the committees like the indifference point as much as
they like the most preferred position of Congress; they are indifferent between
the two. Finally, we locate the status quo (X), which represents the intent of
the legislature that enacted the law.
FIGURE 5
Hypothetical Set of Preferences over Civil Rights Policy57
X

Left

C(M)

M

C

Right

Note: X is the status quo (the intent of the enacting Congress); C(M) represents
the contemporaneous committees’ indifference point (between their most
preferred position and that desired by M); M denotes the most preferred
position of the median member of the contemporaneous Congress; and C is the
most preferred position of the key contemporaneous committees (and other
55. In denoting these most preferred points, we again assume single-peaked preferences. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text. We also assume, that the actors possess complete and
perfect information about the preferences of all other actors and that the sequence of policy
making enfolds as follows: the Court interprets a law, the relevant congressional committees
propose (or do not propose) legislation to override the Court’s interpretation, Congress (if the
committees propose legislation) enacts (or does not enact) an override bill, the President (if
Congress acts) signs (or does not sign) the override bill, and Congress (if the President vetoes)
overrides (or does not override) the veto. These are relatively common assumptions in the legal
literature. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 377-87 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Reneging on History?].
56. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 55,
at 378.
57. Figure 5 is adapted from Ferejohn & Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 25.
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gatekeepers) in Congress that make the decision of whether or not to propose
legislation to their respective houses.
Now suppose a Justice has a case before her that requires interpretation of
a civil rights statute. Where will she place policy? The answer, under the
attitudinal account, is simple: she will place policy precisely where her sincere
preferences lie. If her most preferred position is X, that is where she will vote;
if it is C(M), she will choose that. The answer on the strategic account is that it
depends—it depends on her goal. If she is motivated to see the outcome reflect
as closely as possible her own policy preferences, she will interpret the law in
the C(M)-C interval, with the exact placement contingent on the location of her
ideal point. Placing policy there, for reasons we explain momentarily, will
deter a congressional attempt to overturn. Now suppose rather that her goal is
to interpret the law in line with the intent of the enacting legislature (that is, to
follow a jurisprudence of legislative intent), but, at the same time, to avoid an
override attempt by the current Congress. If she were so motivated,58 then she
will place policy at C(M).
Notice that regardless of whether the Justice is motivated by policy or
intent, under the strategic account she makes a decision in such a way that
avoids a congressional override. That is because she is driven to maximize her
preferences (whatever they may be). If she is inattentive to Congress, she risks
a legislative overruling that places the law far from her most preferred
position; if she is attentive, she can establish a policy close to, but not exactly
on, her ideal point without risking adverse congressional reaction.
This is the central intuition behind strategic behavior, and it brings us to
yet another distinction between the attitudinal model and the strategic account.
Simply put, the strategic account assumes that when goal-oriented Justices
make their decisions they take into account the preferences and likely actions
of other relevant actors—including their colleagues, elected officials, and the
public. The attitudinal model, however, assumes no such thing. This is a
crucial difference because it means, under the attitudinal model, that Justices
always will behave in accord with their sincere preferences; under the strategic
account, they will not necessarily do so. Rather, whether they behave sincerely
or in a sophisticated fashion (that is, in a way that is not compatible with their
most preferred position) will depend on the preferences of the other relevant
actors and they actions they are likely to take.
To see why, let us return to Figure 5, and suppose that the median Justice’s
policy preferences are identical to C(M). The expectation, according to the
attitudinal model, is that she will vote her sincere “attitudes,” here C(M). The
expectation under the strategic account is precisely the same but for a wholly
different reason: she votes C(M), not exclusively because it is her most
preferred position, but also because she has taken into account the
58. This assumes that the President and pivotal veto player in Congress are to the right of X.
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configuration of preferences and realizes that the relevant congressional
committees would have no incentive to override her. Because their
indifference point is the same as her most preferred position, they would be
indifferent to the policy preferred by the Court. Our Justice, thus, has made a
strategic calculation, and that calculation has led her to see that she can vote
sincerely. Under the attitudinal model, even though she too votes sincerely,
she has made no such calculation; she votes reflexively.
Now consider another median Justice—one whose most preferred position
is identical to X (the enacting Congress) in Figure 5. How would this Justice
vote? Again, under the attitudinal model she would cast a sincere vote. That
such a vote would be to the left of the indifference point of the relevant
committees, giving them every incentive to introduce legislation lying at their
preferred point, matters not to her; actually, under the attitudinal model she
never even bothers to make such a calculation. She votes her attitudes without
regard to the other pertinent players in the interaction. Not so, however, under
the strategic account. If the Justice is concerned with seeing her vision of
public policy becoming the law of the land, then we would expect her—given
the distribution of the most preferred positions of the actors in this figure—to
behave in a sophisticated fashion, placing policy not on its ideal point but near
the committees’ indifference point. That is the rational course of action—the
best choice for a Justice interested in policy—because the committees are
indifferent between that point and the most preferred position of the median
member of Congress. They would have no incentive to introduce legislation to
overturn a policy set at the indifference point. Thus, once again she would end
up with a policy close to, but not exactly on, her ideal point without risking
congressional reaction.
There is yet one final distinction between the strategic account and the
attitudinal model, and it is the one with which we started this section: the
strategic account is the far more ambitious one. It is not limited to explaining
votes, and it is not limited to the Supreme Court. Indeed researchers have used
it to address a long list of diverse research questions: from why judges on
discretionary courts review some cases and not others;59 to whether the policy
preferences of other political organizations (for example, the legislature and
executive) influence judicial decisions;60 to what circumstances lead lower
59. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824
(1995); Caldeira et al., supra note 26; Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political
Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 101 (2000).
60. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra
note 55; Eskridge, Reneging on History?, supra note 55; Segal, supra note 27; Pablo T. Spiller &
Rafael Gely, Congressional Control of Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S.
Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992).
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courts to deviate from precedent established by higher courts.61 It also can,
unlike the attitudinal model, shed light on why jurists create and maintain
particular rules, norms, and conventions62—a point that Figure 6 shores up.
There, we depict three choices confronting a Justice over which standard of
review to apply in abortion cases. Suppose a Justice was to select among the
three possible alternatives; further suppose that she sincerely prefers
“compelling interest” to “undue burden” to “rational basis.” Which would she
pick? The attitudinal model, of course, cannot address this question as it
pertains to a non-binary doctrinal choice. The strategic account, however, can.
It supposes that the Justice might choose “undue burden” if, depending on the
preferences of the other players (for example, her colleagues), that would allow
her to avoid “rational basis,” her least preferred outcome.
FIGURE 6
Choices of Legal Standard in Abortion Cases

Compelling Interest

Undue Burden

Less Restrictive

Rational Basis

More Restrictive

Accordingly, when Professor Merrill attempts to use the strategic account
to explain the Court’s agenda and doctrinal choices, its voting behavior, its
support for the government, and so on, he is on firm ground—far firmer than
his use of the attitudinal model. Where his use of the account becomes more
problematic, as we explain in the next section, is in how he derives observable
implications from it.
3.

Deriving Observable Implications

Among political scientists who study judges, the derivation of observable
implications from theory is a controversial matter. One school of thought
holds that we can and even should do so loosely and intuitively, via informal
61. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts, supra note 27; Donald
R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme CourtCircuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994).
62. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000); Knight & Epstein, supra note 20;
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication By A Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent
in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605 (1995).
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reasoning. Some of our examples above illustrate this sort of thinking. For
example, if our theory holds that Justices reach decisions on the basis of their
partisanship then it is not such a large leap to hypothesize that Democratic
judges, controlling for all other relevant factors, should be more likely to
support positions advocated by Democratic candidates. Similarly, observable
implications flowing from the attitudinal model also illustrate the derivation of
observable implications in an intuitive, informal manner. For example, if the
model holds, we ought to find Justices voting in line with their sincerely held
preferences over particular matters of public policy.
This approach may be fine for some theories but it does not work well for
others—including, and perhaps especially, strategic accounts of judging. Too
many studies invoking this account, in our estimation, develop their
hypotheses through loose intuitions about strategy63—with Professor Merrill’s
study being exemplary. Via informal reasoning, Professor Merrill suggests
that during the first Rehnquist Court we ought to see the Justices, if they are
“strategic,” interpreting law in line with the President’s preferred positions (as
expressed in briefs filed by the U.S. Solicitor General). Why? Because the
President, however conservative he was, would modulate his views so as not to
generate an override by Congress. The Court, as conservative as the President,
would thus adopt the Solicitor General’s positions because it would realize that
those positions were about as far right as it could safely move without
triggering a congressional override.
We are troubled by this sort of “informal reasoning” approach for one
simple reason: If scholars are interested in explaining particular decisions as
the equilibrium outcome of the interdependent choices of the relevant actors—
as is Professor Merrill (along with so many other scholars who examine the
“strategic” behavior of judges)—then they must demonstrate why the choices
are in equilibrium. A formal model, with hypotheses derived as implications
of it (rather than via loose intuitions), is an essential feature of such a
demonstration.64 Proceeding in this way also has its share of salutary
byproducts, such as supplying a set of tight, internally consistent expectations,

63. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT
(2000); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief?: Opinion Assignments in
the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421 (1996); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck,
Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
581 (1996); Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on
the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998).
64. This is not to say that strategic analysis is synonymous with formalization. Many
different sorts of studies of courts can benefit from the mere incorporation of the logic of strategic
action and can, in so doing, significantly enhance our understanding of judicial decision making.
See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 3. That does not, however, diminish the importance of
formal analysis for attempts to explain a particular line of decisions or a substantive body of law
as the equilibrium outcome of the interdependent choices of the judges and other actors.
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which, in turn, may not sit comfortably with those derived on the basis of
intuitive conjectures. They may stand in direct contradistinction to those
yielded via loose intuitions, or even if they comport with casual conjecture, the
underlying logic behind them may be quite distinct.65
To make these points, let us revisit Professor Merrill’s “hypothesis,”
which, at bottom, suggests that we should see the first Rehnquist Court
adopting the President’s (Solicitor General’s) position. While the underlying
logic behind this prediction may seem plausible, it is easy to show, using the
simplest of spatial models,66 why it is problematic, or at best requires
clarification. We do so in Figure 1, which depicts Eskridge’s placement of the
ideal points of key external actors over civil rights policy (Professor Merrill’s
empirical reference point) during (roughly) the first Rehnquist Court. Notice
immediately that if the Court is composed of policy-oriented Justices (as
Professor Merrill seems to maintain) it ought not place policy on its ideal point
or on that of the President’s.67 Doing so would generate a congressional
override because the key committees would see that they could introduce
legislation at V (the ideal point of the pivotal veto player in Congress). And
“[s]uch legislation,” as Eskridge writes “would not only be approved by
Congress but also would survive an expected veto.”68 Accordingly, we would
expect the Court to act in a sophisticated fashion, placing policy not on its or
the President’s most preferred point, but on or to the left of V. In this light,
Professor Merrill’s empirical findings—that the Court adopted the position
advocated by the Solicitor General in less than 50% of the cases and that its
rejections were in a liberal direction—are hardly a surprise. They are precisely
what hypotheses derived formally, rather than intuitively, would predict.

65. For an interesting and pointed example, see Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron,
Opinion Assignment in the Supreme Court: Theory and Evidence (Aug. 26, 2001), available at
http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/026/026002LaxJeffrey.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
66. Spatial models, as exemplified in Figures 7 and 8, help scholars investigate how the
decisions of one actor may influence those of another (or others). For a good introduction, see
PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1986).
67. For all the assumptions underlying our interpretation, see supra note 55.
68. Eskridge, Reneging on History?, supra note 55, at 653.
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FIGURE 7
Eskridge’s Civil Rights Preferences, 1981-199069

C(M)
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V

J

P
Left

Right

Note: C(M) represents the committees’ indifference point (between their most
preferred position and that desired by M); C is the most preferred position of
the key current committees (and other gatekeepers) in Congress that make the
decision of whether or not to propose legislation to their respective houses; M
denotes the most preferred position of the median member of Congress; V
represents the most preferred position of the pivotal veto player in Congress; J
is the most preferred position of the median member of the Court; and P
denotes the most preferred position of the President.
Now, we realize that Professor Merrill might object to our interpretation,
claiming that the Solicitor General also would act in a sophisticated fashion
and present positions that reflect V, not P. We know, however, of no
contemporary account of the separation of powers system that adopts this
position, and probably for good reason: it is easy to see what problems might
ensue for the President (Solicitor General)—electoral or otherwise—if he
presents insincere positions to the Court. Conversely, it is far less transparent
to see what he might gain. Providing the Justices with information about
congressional preferences so that their decision survives does not strike us as
one such position. After all, presumably the Justices also have knowledge of
the overall composition of Congress and, thus, already know how far they can
go in making policy pronouncements.
Nonetheless, perhaps Professor Merrill is right. Here, too, however, we
would insist on a formal demonstration of this proposition—one showing the
relative costs and benefits of insincere and sincere behavior on the part of the
Solicitor General. Were Professor Merrill to demonstrate the veracity of his
intuition formally (and empirically), he would make a substantial contribution
to literature on the separation of powers system.

69. Id. at 653 fig.3.
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D. Data and Methodology
As our stress on “empirically” above suggests, once political scientists
derive observable implications—whether loosely or informally—their next
task is to assess them against data— whether those data are qualitative or
quantitative in nature. This is a central feature of the political science project
on judging, and one too that may trace directly to Pritchett: When he sought to
assess his hypotheses against data, he set the tone for generations of political
scientists who study courts. We are now, as Pritchett was, consciously
empirical, placing a great deal of emphasis on the degree to which data support
our theories.
At the same time, our approach to assessing the implications of our
theories has matured with time. Great bodies of literature have emerged to
deal with crucial features of empirical research, be they the measurement of
variables,70 the tools for analyzing data,71 and the techniques for depicting
results,72 to name just three.
What we focus on here is yet another area where we have made progress:
the data themselves. When Pritchett and his immediate successors sought to
explore political approaches to judging, they coded and collected their own
data without fully evaluating their procedures or worrying too much about
whether others could evaluate them. That would (or, perhaps more accurately,
should) not fly today. Contemporary researchers must, at the very least, take
all steps necessary to ensure compliance with the replication standard:
Another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and

70. The literature on measurement is indeed immense, with entire fields of study devoted to
measuring psychological well-being, health, income, education, happiness, survey responses,
intelligence, and numerous others. For applications in the context of judging, see, e.g., Epstein &
King, supra note 4; Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 261 (1996); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 66 (2000); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001).
71. Again, the number is immense. For interesting applications in the context of judging, see
Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 361 (2001); Martin & Quinn, supra note 49; James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G.
Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091 (2001);
Christopher J.W. Zorn, Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review
with Applications, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 470 (2001).
72. For a recent example, see King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341 (2000); for applications in the context of
judging, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial
Experience (and Its Consequences for the U.S. Supreme Court), 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
July 2003); Martin & Quinn, supra note 49.
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reproduce the research without any additional information from the author.73
Why we insist on this standard is no great mystery. In a broad sense, its point
is to ensure that a published work stands alone so that readers can consume
what it has to offer and evaluate it without any necessary connection with,
further information from, or beliefs about the status or reputation of the author.
The replication standard keeps empirical inquiry above the level of ad
hominem attacks on or unquestioning acceptance of arguments by authority
figures.
Much is involved in meeting the standard, and frankly, few individual
data-collection enterprises on judging fully succeed. Perhaps that is why
political scientists working in this field have turned in droves to the so-called
“multi-user” databases. The idea behind these is straightforward enough:
Rather than collect data designed to answer particular research questions —
such as those Professor Merrill raises (for example, how might we explain the
decline in the number of opinions written by the Court, what accounts for the
decrease in the number of judgments, why do we see a rise in the proportion of
the docket devoted to federalism matters, and so on)—amass large databases
so rich in content that multiple users, even those with distinct projects, can
draw on them and amass them in accord with all the best scientific practices
and procedures.74
Several multi-user databases pertaining to courts now exist75 and others are
in progress. Certainly the most important and influential, however, is “The
Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database”76 or, as it is
commonly called in political science circles, “The Spaeth Database.” Actually,
this is not one but a series of databases developed by Harold J. Spaeth, a
Michigan State political scientist and University of Michigan law graduate,
that contain many attributes of Supreme Court decisions handed down since
1946, ranging from the date of the oral argument to the identities of the parties
to the litigation, to how the Justices voted.77 Specifically, all Spaeth databases
73. We derive this paragraph from Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 38-44; Gary King,
Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444 (1995).
74. In addition to these benefits, large public-use databases have what is known a
combinatoric advantage. See Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 21-23.
75. See, e.g., The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, Research Databases and Data
Archives, available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/databases.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003)
[hereinafter Research Databases and Data Archive]. For more information about the databases,
see Sara C. Benesh, Becoming an Intelligent User of the Spaeth Supreme Court Databases
(2002), available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
76. The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, The Original United States Supreme Court
Database, 1953-2001 Terms, available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last
updated Feb. 11, 2003).
77. For a full list of attributes (variables) in the Spaeth database, see Harold J. Spaeth, The
Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2001 Terms: Documentation
(Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Mar. 4,
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contain (at minimum) nearly 250 variables, grouped into six sets: votes and
opinions, background, chronology, substance, outcome, and identification of
the cases.
We list the basic variables in Table 1, even though any such listing cannot
do justice to the richness of some of Spaeth’s codings. Take, for example, his
“issue” variable: It identifies “the subject matter of the controversy” as falling
into one of scores upon scores of specific and discrete categories. In the area
of criminal procedure alone there are well over hundreds of distinct issues,
including “speedy trial,” “right to counsel,” and “cruel and unusual
punishment” (with separate values for death and non-death penalty related
cases). His “party” variable contains nearly two hundred categories from
“accused person” to “witness” and just about everything in between. The
database even houses a variable of particular value to Professor Merrill’s
project, “natural court,” or the term political scientists use to describe periods,
such as the one between 1994 and the present, during which no personnel
change occurred on the Court. While the inclusion of such a variable may
seem unnecessary—after all, it would appear simple enough to generate from
existing variables (for example, “term”) via a few commands in most any
statistical software packages (for example, “compute” or “recode” in SPSS)—
Spaeth, with characteristic care, explains why this is emphatically not the case:
Scholars have subdivided [natural courts] into “strong” and “weak” natural
courts, but no convention exists as to the dates on which they begin and end.
Options include 1) date of confirmation, 2) date of seating, 3) cases decided
after seating, and 4) cases argued and decided after seating. A strong court is
delineated by the addition of a new justice or the departure of an incumbent. A
weak court, by comparison, is any group of nine justices even if lengthy
vacancies occurred. Thus . . . the first thirty months of the Burger Court
comprise three strong natural courts, but only one weak one: the eight justices
who sat during the 1969 term, the addition of Blackmun at the very end of the
1969 term, and the seven-member Court that sat from the retirements of Black
and Harlan at the beginning of the 1971 term until the arrival of Powell and
Rehnquist a few months later. These thirty months comprise a single weak
natural court because only nine justices sat during this period, even though
only six of the nine held membership from its beginning to its end.78

2003) [hereinafter Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation]. The data themselves may
be found at The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, U.S. Supreme Court Databases, available
at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/plpj/sctdata1.html (last visited March 26, 2003). The listing in
Table 1 is from the “original” Spaeth Database. See Supreme Court Judicial Database
Documentation, at iv-vi. Since creating it, Spaeth (with various collaborators) has produced
several others, which are also available at the Web site. See Research Databases and Data
Archive, supra note 75.
78. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 30 (citations
omitted).
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TABLE 1
Outline of Variables in the Spaeth Databases
identification variables
1, 2, 3. case citations
4. docket number
5. unit of analysis
6. number of records per
unit of analysis
background variables
7. manner in which the
Court takes jurisdiction
8. administrative action
preceding litigation
9. three-judge district
court
10. origin of case
11. source of case
12. lower court
disagreement
13. reason for granting
cert
14, 15. parties
16. disposition of case
by court whose decision
the Supreme Court
reviewed
17. direction of the
lower court’s decision
chronological variables
18. date of oral
argument

19. reargument date
20. decision date
21. term of Court
22. chief justice
23. natural court
SUBSTANTIVE
VARIABLES

24. legal provisions
considered
by the Court
25. multiple legal
provisions
26, 27, 28. authority for
decision
29. issue
30. issue areas
31. direction of decision
32. direction of decision
based on dissent
OUTCOME VARIABLES

33. type of decision
34. multiple
memorandum decisions
35. disposition of case
36. unusual disposition
37. winning party
38. formal alteration of
precedent

voting and opinion
variables
39. declarations of
unconstitutionality
40. the vote in the case
41. vote not clearly
specified
42-70. the votes,
opinions, and
interagreements of the
individual justices
71-99. the individual
justice’s votes
100-128. the individual
justice’s opinions
129-157, 158-186. the
special opinion(s) with
which the individual
justice agreed
187-215. direction of
the individual justices’
votes
216-244. majority and
minority voting by
justice
245. majority opinion
assigner
246. majority opinion
writer
247. minimum winning
coalition

These complications required Spaeth to make some decisions about
precisely how to define a “natural court,” settling ultimately on the following:
I have divided the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts into strong
natural courts, each of which begins when the Reports first specify that the
new justice is present but not necessarily participating in the reported case.
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Similarly, a natural court ends on the date when the Reports state that an
incumbent justice has died, retired, or resigned.79

At the same time, however, he also provides users with an alterative: “In
the description and listing of the natural courts below, I parenthetically
designate the strong natural courts that constitute a weak natural court for those
of you who prefer that focus.”80
In short and taken collectively, Spaeth’s databases are “a virtual
compendium of ‘anything anyone would ever want to know about the Court’—
or at least anything that is amenable to quantification.”81 Even so, this
information, however comprehensive, would be nearly useless if it did not
meet the replication standard—but it does. Over the years, Spaeth has hired
various assistants to replicate samples of the data, and the rates at which they
agree with his codings are remarkable. The reason, we suspect, is that he
provides exhaustive definitions of the variables and their values. This holds
even for those as seemingly plain and obvious as case citations, as this excerpt
from Spaeth’s documentation attests:
Variables 1, 2, 3
case citations (US, SCT, LED)
The three variables in these fields provide the citation to each case from
the official United States Reports (US) and the two major unofficial Reports,
the Lawyers’ Edition of the United States Reports (LED) and the Supreme
Court Reporter (SCT). The volume number precedes the slash bar; the page
number on which the case begins follows. When these citations appear in
printed form, any zeros that precede any other cardinal number are dropped.
Thus, the database LED citation, 086/0011, should be read as 86 L Ed 2d 11.
Note that all LED citations are to the second series except for volumes 98, 99,
and 100 which are cited without “2d.” These three volumes cover the first
three terms of the Warren Court (1953-1955). Note that the database does not
distinguish between citations to volumes 98, 99, and 100 of the first series and
volumes 98, 99, and 100 of the second series. The latter cover a portion of the
1987 term. This overlap should cause no trouble unless you use as a ‘select if’
command reference to these volumes of the LED.
All US and LED citations were copied directly from the published
volumes. SCT citations were derived from the conversion table to the United
States Reports which is located in the front of the various volumes of the
Supreme Court Reporter.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Lee Epstein, Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83 JUDICATURE 224, 225 (2000).
We adapt this paragraph and several to follow from this piece. Id.
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Citations to the Lawyers’ Edition are current. Those to the other two
Reporters are not. Because of the ready availability of case citations to the
United States Reports and the Supreme Court Reporter I stopped entering
these data a number of terms ago.
Not every record is cited to each source. I do not find either Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957), or United States
v. Louisiana, 409 U.S. 17 (1972), in the Lawyers’ Edition. On the other hand,
the United States Reports do not contain those cases in which a justice dissents
from the granting of an attorney’s request for admission to the Bar of the
United States Supreme Court. E.g., In the Matter of Admission of Leda M.C.
Hartwell, William Evans Benton, and Michael T. Rose, 71 L Ed 2d 641, 859,
and 862 (1982), respectively. Relative to the Court’s formally decided cases,
this sort of memorandum decision is trivial. Because citations to the Supreme
Court Reporter are derived from a conversion table, as mentioned above, cases
not cited in the United States Reports will have no parallel SCT citation, as
will cases that the conversion table otherwise omits.
Pagination does not invariably proceed chronologically throughout the
volumes. Hence, do not assume that because a given citation has a higher page
number than that of another case it was decided on the same or a later date as
the other case. The only accurate way to sequence the cases chronologically is
by indexing or otherwise sequencing each case’s date of decision (DEC),
variable 20.82

At first blush, this level of detail may seem unnecessary, even fussy. On
deeper reflection, however, it is critical for all users and consumers of the data.
That is so for several reasons, chief among them is that the “fussy” details
facilitate replication and reproduction; it also makes it possible to build on
Spaeth’s project. However comprehensive his databases may be, some
scholars will inevitably desire to analyze a variable it does not contain in
conjunction with a variable(s) that it does. Professor Merrill’s analysis of
support for the Solicitor General provides an example. While the Spaeth
databases incorporate all the information Professor Merrill requires on issue
areas and judicial votes, they fail to house data on the participation of the
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae.83 Nonetheless, so long as the researcher
has in hand a citation, the docket number, or some other identifier of cases in
which the Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief, it is easy enough to
add the variable or variables of interest to the database.84

82. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 1-2.
83. It does, however, identify when the United States is a party to the suit. See Spaeth’s
party_1 and party_2 variables. Id. at 16-27.
84. Some scholars have already have taken this step. See Segal & Reedy, supra note 43, at
559.
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By the same token, it is a trivial task to recategorize the values of Spaeth’s
variables. So, for example, if scholars take issue with the way that he has
coded the direction of Court decisions (as liberal or conservative)—as some in
the legal community have—they can correct whatever “problems” they
perceive with simple commands common to virtually all statistical software
packages (again, “recode” or “compute” in SPSS). That they can do so is, yet
again, a credit to Spaeth: his detailed documentation makes completely
transparent his definitions of concepts such as “liberal” and “conservative.”
We could go on extolling the virtues of the databases, but it is the larger
point that should not be missed: Spaeth’s products meet all aspects of the
replication standard. Without consulting their developer, researchers can
reproduce, replicate, and build on them—and they have. The Spaeth databases
are so dominating in our discipline that it would certainly be unusual for a
refereed journal to publish a manuscript whose data derived from an alternate
source.85 Even in the law reviews, virtually no empirical study of the U.S.
Supreme Court produced by political scientists fails to draw on them.
It is, thus, a mystery to us as to why the databases have not made greater
inroads into the legal community; as to why law professors and their students,
instead of relying on Spaeth’s efforts in part or in full, proceed as political
scientists did some decades ago: they collect their own data. Whatever the
answers, we want to urge the legal community against continuing along this
path. Not only is it time consuming and duplicative, but it almost inevitably
leads to data that do not meet the replication standard.
We learned this when, for another project, we attempted to replicate a table
in a source commonly used by legal academics (including Professor Merrill),
the Harvard Law Review; specifically, the statistics it publishes in its annual
reviews of the Court’s term.86 Even giving Harvard every benefit of the
doubt—including focusing our replication efforts on a table we (and apparently
Harvard87) thought would be the most straightforward to replicate—Table
1(A) which lists the “Actions of Individual Justices”88—we could not even
85. Most empirical articles on judicial behavior, published over the last decade in the leading
political science journals, avail themselves of one of the Spaeth databases. For example, of the
nine papers in the American Political Science Review (appearing between 1991-2000), 78% (n=7)
relied on Spaeth’s data; that figure for the American Journal of Political Science over the same
time is 88% (fifteen of seventeen). Those that did not utilize the Spaeth databases typically relied
on survey data or focused on the decisions of courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court.
86. See Epstein, supra note 81.
87. In fact, in its review of the 1967 Term—which Harvard says provides “[a] complete
explanation” of how it compiles its tables, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116
HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002)—it claims that “the construction” of this table “is
accomplished primarily through tabulations as mechanical and simple as counting.” The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term—Business of the Court: The Statistics, 82 HARV. L. REV. 301, 302 (1968).
88. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453
tbl.1(A) (2002).
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begin to reproduce it without serious detective work. Even then, we still could
not replicate it; we certainly could not update it.
We faced similar problems with Professor Merrill’s data. To provide but
one example, consider his Figure 2, which contains information on the number
of opinions written per Term, along with his description of the data-collection
procedures:
The numbers are taken from the statistics compiled in the annual Supreme
Court volume of the Harvard Law Review published each November. They
reflect a category that the Review calls “opinions written,” which varies
slightly from cases orally argued because it includes some per curium
decisions in which the Court does not hear argument and excludes some cases
that are dismissed after argument without a decision.89

Despite Professor Merrill’s laudable efforts at explaining his research
procedures, they are not replicable: another researcher could not understand,
evaluate, build on, and reproduce them without talking to the students at the
Harvard Law Review. To see why, think about what information an
investigator would need to know, but that the authors do not provide, to
replicate their work. A couple of the necessary questions would be:
What is the unit of analysis? That is, did the students at Harvard base their
counts on docket numbers or case citations? This question arises because
occasionally the Court will consolidate several cases (with different docket
numbers) under one citation, making it possible for a Justice to join, say, the
majority with regard to one case, but the dissent in another, even if the citation
is the same. It is, however, not a question that Harvard explicitly answers.90
This is unfortunate because, as Figure 8 shows, whether a researcher relies on
docket numbers (that is, explodes cases within one citation) or citations can
lead to different counts.

89. Merrill, supra note 2, at 579 n.21.
90. Harvard simply refers the reader to its review of the 1967 Supreme Court term for “[a]
complete explanation of how the [table is] compiled.” The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The
Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002). This did, in fact, provide more detail but did
not contain information about the unit of analysis. It was only by going back to its review of the
1960 Term that we thought we found an answer:
Table[] . . . IV deal[s] with those full opinions of the Court that dispose of the cases on the
merits. Since it is not unusual for one opinion to dispose of more than one docketed case,
the total number of full opinions, 118, is fewer than the number of cases listed [in a table
dealing with the final disposition of cases].
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Business of the Court, 75 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (1961)
(footnote omitted). While far from clear, this statement suggests that those compiling the 1960
data used case citation as the unit of analysis; whether more contemporary students followed suit,
we can only guess.
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FIGURE 8
Number of Supreme Court Cases by Citation and Docket Number91

What per curiam decisions counted as “opinions”? The Harvard Law
Review states that it includes only those per curiam decisions containing “legal
reasoning substantial enough to be considered full opinions.”92 Almost
needless to write, such a criterion does not meet any accepted or acceptable
standards of scientific work with which we are aware. What “substantial”
reasoning means to the editors of the Harvard Law Review may be quite
different from what it means to readers of this essay or to us. It may even be
the case that each class of Harvard Law Review students interpret it in distinct
ways. Accordingly, we, our readers, and the compilers of the data themselves
might all select different per curiam decisions to incorporate into our counts.
91. We created this figure from the Spaeth database, using analu=0 (for case citations) and
analu=0 or 1 (for docket number) and dec_type=1, 6, or 7.
92. The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002).
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Perhaps out of recognition of this problem, Harvard provides a list of the
per curiam decisions it includes. Frankly, however, this does not help matters
much because, in all likelihood, investigators (including the students
themselves) would be unable to recreate its list for earlier or update it for later
periods; “substantial” legal reasoning seems too imprecise of a phrase to admit
replication.
Worth noting is that neither of these issues would arise with the Spaeth
database. As for the unit of analysis, Spaeth lets the reader choose among
several options, with the most relevant here being (0) case citation or (1)
docket number. As for the types of decisions (Spaeth’s DEC_TYPE variable),
he also provides alternatives (listed below) from which the researcher could
choose one or all seven:
DEC_TYPE=1: Cases in which the Court hears oral argument and which it
decides by a signed opinion. These are the Court’s so-called formally decided
full opinion cases.
DEC_TYPE=2: Cases decided with an opinion but without hearing oral
argument; i.e., per curiam.
DEC_TYPE=3: Memorandum cases. These are summary decisions that deal
with petitions for certiorari and appeals, requests of individuals and
organizations to participate as amicus curiae, and various other motions,
orders, and writs. These are segregated from the other types of decisions by
their location in the back of the various volumes of the United States Reports
beginning at page 801 or 901 or later.
DEC_TYPE=4: Decrees. This infrequent type of decision usually arises under
the Court’s original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. The
justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a
report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court’s decision. The
presence of the label, “decree,” distinguishes this type of decision from the
others.
DEC_TYPE=5: Cases decided by an equally divided vote. When a justice
fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy, the participating
justices may cast a tie vote. In such cases, the Reports merely state that “the
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided vote” and the name of any
nonparticipating justice(s). Their effect is to uphold the decision of the court
whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
DEC_TYPE=6: This decision type is a variant of the formally decided cases
(DEC_TYPE=1). It differs from type 1 only in that no individual justice’s
name appears as author of the Court’s opinion. Instead, these unsigned orally
argued cases are labeled as decided “per curiam.” The difference between this
type and DEC_TYPE=2 is the occurrence of oral argument in the former but
not the latter. In both types the opinion of the Court is unsigned; i.e., per
curiam.
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DEC_TYPE=7: Judgments of the Court. This decision type is also a variant of
the formally decided cases. It differs from type 1 in that less than a majority of
the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice
assigned to write the Court’s opinion. Except for those interested only in the
authors of the opinions of the Court, DEC_TYPE=7 should be included in
analyses of the Court’s formally decided cases.93

We could summon other examples of barriers to replication within
Harvard’s data work94 but they would all lead to the same conclusion: If
scholars want to collect their own data, then they must take as much care as
Spaeth does to meet the replication standard. Spaeth provides precise
definitions of all the variables included in his database; Harvard provides, at
most, bare clues and at minimum subjective criteria. Based on Spaeth’s
definitions we or any could easily reproduce his data and the results they yield;
based on Harvard’s, we could not.
Which, of course, leads us back to the question of why scholars—whether
political scientists or law professors—working on the Supreme Court would
collect their own data from scratch when so much of what they may require
already is in Spaeth’s product. Honestly, we cannot think of a single reason.
Even if some of the variables of interest are not housed in Spaeth’s, we would
bet that many others are, or could be adapted to the researchers’ requirements;
whatever remains, as we suggest above, they could easily incorporate.
III. CONCLUSION
We want to end this piece much as we began it: We are all in Professor
Merrill’s debt for advancing, perhaps even starting, a conversation between
political scientists and law professors. For, even though we may have been
critical in spots, we truly believe Professor Merrill has performed a tremendous
service for both communities of scholars.
Indeed, he has executed his task so competently that he has made our work
all the more. It is now up to us, again whether in the law or political science
world, to build on his foundation. We have attempted to do so, briefly
highlighting some of the key features of the political science project on
judging—and we do mean briefly. We have barely scratched the surface in
terms of the overall project, leaving important topics nearly completely
unaddressed. Moreover, we have only minimally touched on a key insight in
Professor Merrill’s paper—one centering on what he calls periods of

93. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 58-59 (emphasis
added). Note that Spaeth provides (limited) advice on which to use. For more comprehensive
guidance, see Benesh, supra note 76.
94. For example, Harvard does not reveal the source of the data (whether it is U.S. Reports,
LEXIS, etc.). For why this is important, see supra pp. 810-12, which contains Spaeth’s analysis
of the citation variables in his data set.
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membership “stasis” or what our colleagues in political science might deem as
“natural courts”—preferring to set it aside for another paper in which we
would have the space to do it justice.
The next steps seem obvious. First, we call on more political scientists to
join the conversation that Professor Merrill has so ably and admirably moved
forward. Those of us who systematically study judging are a varied lot, and
undoubtedly some among us will take issue with aspects of our description of
the disciplinary project. Law professors should hear their voices. Likewise,
political scientists ought to hear the voices of legal academics. After all, if
research is nothing else, it is a social enterprise: the advancement of knowledge
depends on an active community of scholars working, not in isolation, but
together in cooperation and competition. Professor Merrill’s paper is a great
example of this principle in action; we only hope that it will be the first of
many more.
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